Chinese WU-14 hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV)


Date:2016-12-19 Source:wikipedia By:Globalmil Viewed:

Chinese Hypersonic Gliding Vehicle.jpg
One of the configurations of Chinese HGVs
WU-14 was the Pentagon's code name for a Chinese experimental hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), which is now called the DF-ZF.
The DF-ZF (previously designated as the WU-14) is a hypersonic missile delivery vehicle that has been flight-tested by the Chinese seven times, on : 9 January, 7 August and 2 December 2014; 7 June and 27 November 2015[1] and April 2016.
DF-ZF(以前称为WU-14)是一种高超音速导弹运载器已经被中国进行了七次飞行试验,于:2014年1月9日,8月7日和12月2日; 2015年6月7日和11月27日和2016年4月。
The Chinese Defense Ministry confirmed its January 2014 test and said the test was "scientific" in nature, although it was widely viewed as part of a broader Chinese military build-up.The August 2014 test was described as a failure by U.S. officials; the other tests were apparently successful.All the test launches were performed at the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center in Shanxi Province, the main long-range missile testing center for the People's Liberation Army.
Capabilities and design
"The DF-ZF HGV can allegedly reach speeds between Mach 5 and Mach 10" (i.e., between 6,173 km/hour (3,836 mph) and 12,359 km/hour (7,680 mph).According to Jane's Defence Weekly and others, the DF-ZF could be used for nuclear weapons delivery but could also be used to perform precision-strike conventional missions (for example, next-generation anti-ship ballistic missiles), which could penetrate "the layered air defenses of a U.S. carrier strike group."
“DF-ZF HGV可以据说达到5马赫和10马赫的速度”(即6173公里/小时(3836英里每小时)和12359公里/小时(7680英里每小时)之间。据简氏防务周刊和其他来源,DF-ZF可用于核武器递送,但也可以用来执行精确打击的常规任务(例如,下一代反舰弹道导弹),它可以穿透“美国航母打击群的多层防空系统”。
The DF-ZF is a dangerous weapon because hypersonic glider vehicles are "almost impossible to intercept by conventional missile defense systems, which track incoming objects via satellite sensors and ground and sea radar."One weakness in the Chinese DF-ZF program, however, is a lack of high-performance computing power, which stymies design.
The HGV is intended to be less susceptible to anti-ballistic missile countermeasures than conventional reentry vehicles (RVs). Normal RVs descend through the atmosphere on a predictable ballistic trajectory - their high speeds makes intercepting them extremely difficult. By the late 1980s, however, several countries began to develop interceptor missiles designed to destroy ballistic RVs. A hypersonic glider like the HGV could pull-up after reentering the atmosphere and approach its target in a relatively flat glide, lessening the time it can be detected, fired at, or reengaged if the initial attack failed. Gliding makes it more maneuverable and extends its range.
在HGV旨在成为相比传统再入飞行器(RVS)不易被反弹道导弹系统对抗。普通运载器穿越大气层降落到一个可预测的弹道 - 他们的高速度使得拦截极其困难。到了80年代后期,一些国家开始发展设计拦截导弹用来摧毁弹道导弹运载器。像HGV高超音速滑翔机可以重新进入大气层后上拉并在一个相对平坦的滑行状态接近目标,减少它可以被探测到,在攻击,或如果初始攻击失败的时候重启。滑翔使得它更机动,并扩展其射程。

A vehicle like the WU-14 could be fitted to various Chinese ballistic missiles, such as the DF-21 medium-range missile (extending range from 2,000 to 3,000 km (1,200 to 1,900 mi)), and the DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missiles (extending range from 8,000 to 12,000 km (5,000 to 7,500 mi). Analysts suspect that the WU-14 will first be used in shorter-range roles as an anti-ship missile and for other tactical purposes to address the problem of hitting a moving target with a ballistic missile. Long-term goals may include deterrence of U.S. missile capabilities with the prospect of strategic bombardment against America, or other countries. With conventional interceptor missiles having difficulty against targets with late detection and maneuvering while traveling faster than Mach 5 (the WU-14 reenters the atmosphere at Mach 10), the U.S. may place more importance on developing directed-energy weapons as a countermeasure.
The HGV stays within the stratosphere after reentry and pull-up, and glides through the air. Although that creates more drag, warheads fly further than they would on a higher trajectory through space, and are too low to be intercepted by exo-atmospheric kill vehicles. The tradeoff is that warheads have less speed and altitude as they near the target, making them vulnerable to lower-tier interceptors.[5] Potential counter-hypersonic interception measures may involve laser or rail gun technologies.
One of the configurations of Chinese HGVs
Role Experimental aircraft
National origin People's Republic of China
First flight 9 January 2014
角色 实验性航空器
国家 中华人民共和国
首次飞行 2014年1月9日

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      Chinese WU-14 hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV)  
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